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Our research is focused upon new methods to support decision-making on acquisitions in a system 
of systems (SoS). We have improved upon prior work by introducing both an extension to the previously 
developed Computational Exploratory Model (CEM) and a decision-analysis framework that addresses 
issues of identifying optimal collections of interconnected systems.  An Agent-Based Model (ABM) 
approach extends prior CEM capabilities by enabling the development of a simulation to model 
interdependencies between constituent systems in a SoS. A robust investment portfolio framework 
complements the approach by providing a means to objectively balance expected performance, cost, and 
risks in identifying optimal collections of systems that constitute a SoS. 
Executive Summary 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized the need for effective tools in managing 
collections of systems that, when operating in a networked manner, serve to provide an overarching set of 
capabilities. Acquisition management of these systems of systems (SoSs) is difficult due to the complex 
interdependencies that exist between constituent systems, both across the programmatic and technical 
phases of development. The identification of developmental risks, their consequences, and expected 
payoffs (potential gains in SoS-wide capabilities) are equally important in identifying an optimal SoS 
architecture. 
Research efforts during this report period have focused on extending previous frameworks of the 
Computational Exploratory Model (CEM) and Markov-based analytic approach. The CEM and Markov 
approaches were developed as means of comparing different networks of systems and quantifying 
cascading modes of risks that propagate due to the interconnectivities that exist between constituent 
systems. The cascading risks transcend both technical and programmatic dimensions of acquisition 
management and often produce developmental delays.  The research in this report assumes a two-pronged 
approach. The first introduces an Agent-Based Model (ABM) that extends the exploratory nature of the 
prior CEM and Markov approaches by considering the dynamics and propagating risks beyond their 
purely probabilistic setting. ABMs are extremely well suited to simulating complex interactions of a SoS, 
and can incorporate a large range of types of information that drive the interactive behavior between 
participating “agents.” 
The second approach complements the exploratory nature of the aforementioned work with a 
decision-analysis framework that is centered on an investment portfolio approach. The acquisition 
strategy proposed in our project is based on the 16 technical management and technical system-
engineering processes outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook  (DAG; U.S. DoD, 2008a), often 
referred to as the 5000-series guide, and the DoD Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems 
(SoS-SE; U.S. DoD, 2008b) guide. Decisions on system acquisitions are accomplished by adapting 
algorithmic advances in robust portfolio optimization techniques from financial engineering and 
operations research, to deal with uncertainties that can affect optimal selection of “portfolios” of systems 
in a SoS. The report details an approach to SoS acquisition in the form of a robust optimization problem 
that balances rewards (potential gain in SoS-wide capabilities) against developmental risks and 
acquisition cost. The approach is illustrated by using a simple concept problem based on the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) platform.  
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Outreach and Collaboration 
Work documented in this report has resulted in a conference publication and a presentation at the 
NPS Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium in 2012. Resulting interactions have produced very 
valuable feedback on the merits of our current results and potential further development of the portfolio 
approach. The symposium especially allowed us to foster closer ties and exchanges with various members 
of the NPS community. In particular, we have been involved in collaborative exchanges with Dr. Tom 
Housel and Dr. Jonathan Mun, who are actively involved in the development of portfolio-based 
approaches for acquisition and risk management. The work in this report has also been presented at the 
INFORMS 2012 Conference, October 14–17, in Phoenix, AZ. The conference presentation generated 
useful feedback from attending practitioners in the operations research and financial engineering 
communities, focused on ways to improve and further develop the framework presented in this report.   
Introduction 
A system of systems (SoS) consists of a network of operationally and managerially independent 
systems that work synergistically in achieving an overarching capability (Maier, 1998). This confluence 
of multiple entities gives rise to an emergent behavior that may not be explicitly apparent from the 
individual constituents. The SoS paradigm has motivated the development of new acquisition strategies 
and integration of individual systems to better address the issue of achieving a set of overall capabilities 
instead of requirement-specific metrics. Acquisition efforts to obtain SoS capabilities for projects such as 
the U.S. Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS; Gilmore, 2006) and the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater 
System have been met with a large degree of developmental difficulties. This includes a combination of 
vulnerabilities in the developmental stage and poor management oversight that often leads to costly 
schedule overruns and, ultimately, cancellations. These large-scale systems are often developed 
incrementally with system-level requirements being the immediate focus of attention.  Implicit 
consideration is given to the overarching objectives of the intended SoS capability. The decoupled and 
decentralized nature of architecting SoS across multiple hierarchies of interdependencies has given rise to 
a range of inefficiencies and warranted the pursuit of better systems engineering practices to encompass 
SoS principles.   
The recognition of the need for improved methods in architecting and acquiring systems that 
comprise a SoS has led to further research in developing frameworks that maximize SoS-wide capabilities 
whilst minimizing cost and mitigating risk. Our prior efforts under NPS Acquisition research program 
funding have introduced the concept of a Computational Exploratory Model (CEM)—a discrete event 
simulator for the development and acquisition process.  The CEM is based on the 16 basic technical 
management and technical systems-engineering processes outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
(U.S. DoD, 2008a)—referred to as the 5000-series guide.  The method also considers the modified 
processes in accordance with the Systems Engineering Guide for System-of-Systems (SoS-SE; U.S. DoD, 
2008b) that adapts the 5000-series guide processes to the SoS framework. Research work in the present 
reporting period sought to provide a complementary decision-making tool that focuses on balancing 
capability development against cost and interdependent risks through the use of Modern Portfolio Theory 
(MPT).   
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Extending CEM and Markov: Agent-Based Modeling Approach 
 Research conducted in the previous reporting period extended the CEM work to include a 
Markov perspective (Mane, DeLaurentis, & Frazho, 2011) that utilizes network-level metrics and 
computes conditional probabilities that relate the transmission of cascading risks between nodes (systems) 
in an interconnected SoS network. The Markov extension to the CEM approach allows for the comparison 
of alternate SoS architectures, with the intention of mitigating cascading risks and identifying SoS 
architectures with desired overarching capabilities. However, both the CEM and Markov approaches 
require inputs on interaction and performance in the general SoS setting. Our current work extends the 
CEM and Markov approaches to now include an Agent-Based Model (ABM) that allows for the modeling 
of interacting entities as discrete “agents.” Each agent has a predefined set of behaviors and rules of 
interaction. The modeling and simulation of these interacting agents allows for a more generalized 
computational framework that is not predominantly based on fixed probabilities, but rather, on a much 
wider range of possible metrics for simulation. The fidelity of the ABM is tuned such that its outputs are 
well suited to the required inputs for our CEM, Markov-based, and robust portfolio models. We motivate 
this addition with the simulation of a naval warfare scenario that is based on the Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) platform.  
Example Application: Naval Warfare SoS Agent-Based Model 
 Full-scale littoral battle scenarios involve a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) squadron with a mix of 
ships and accompanying helicopters, unmanned aerial and surface vehicles, and a host of antagonist units. 
Such scenarios exhibit all the characteristics of a SoS problem with each individual asset possessing 
operational and managerial independence, with spatial distribution, and evolving with time to exhibit 
emergent behavior as a result of system interaction. Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is ideally suited to 
tackle SoS problems, and Purdue University has its very own MATLAB-based simulation framework 
called Discrete Agent Framework (DAF). Hence an agent-based simulation model was developed using 
DAF to capture the performance of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in a warfare scenario involving 
multiple mission threats. The ABM itself was based on the models described in three masters’ theses from 
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (Abbot, 2008; Ozdemir, 2009; Jacobson, 2010). Military and industry 
experts have verified that the agents, that constitute the SoS, are based on realistic and well-reviewed 
information.  
Enemy Forces 
 In order to accurately capture how LCS will perform in a stressing operational environment, a 
robust scenario containing three different types of antagonist units—missile boats, submarines, and 
mines—was developed. Each type of enemy unit was assigned a home position at the start of the scenario. 
The missile boats and submarines exhibit different patrol, detection, and engagement strategies, while the 
mines used in this simulation simply detonate whenever an agent is within its proximity radius. 
Friendly Forces 
 The LCS was designed primarily to take advantage of the interchangeable modularized onboard 
packages. Each of the following packages was modeled in the simulation scenario: Surface Warfare 
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(SUW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Mine Countermeasures (MCM). Apart from the primary 
mission package, the protagonist forces were augmented by the presence of a host of supporting entities 
which included—MH-60R, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), 
and Remote Mine-Hunting Vehicles (RMVs). Each of the units has different capabilities and tackles 
different antagonist units, depending on the LCS mission package to which it is affiliated. 
Neutral Forces 
 Merchant traffic was included to emulate realism in the scenarios and to add to the surface clutter, 
thereby making detection more difficult for both the protagonist and antagonist units. 
Goal  
 The mission  of  the  LCS  fleet  was  to  clear  the  waters  of  all threats, while incurring the 
minimum number of friendly casualties. The factors that played an important role in this simulation are 
the number of enemy platforms, the number and type of LCS, the detection probability for the friendly 
sensors, and the kill probability of friendly weapons. 
Results 
 Multiple simulation runs were carried out in order to analyze the battle scenario and the agent 
behavior. Figure 1 displays the starting and the emergent scenario that arises for a typical run case.  
 
 
 The Naval Warfare Simulation, depicted in Figure 1, provides a good insight into the workings of 
agent-based modeling and serves as an ideal exploratory model to glean the mission performance for a 
naval warfare scenario. The model captures salient emergent behavior and properties that result from the 
collective interaction among the system components and provides inroads in capturing the performance 
and the shortcomings of the LCS. 
 Multiple simulation runs were carried out in order to analyze the battle scenario and the agent 
behavior. Table 1 depicts the results from a typical simulation run.  
Figure 1, Naval Warfare Simulation Scenario 
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MBS 1 (17.8,111.18) 623 SUW LCS (30.88,96.62) NLOS 
MBS 2 (17.96,110.09) 635 SUW LCS (28.25,99.63) NLOS 
MBS 3 (18.65,112.08) 642 SUW LCS (26.72,101.39) NLOS 
MBS 4 (19.2,112.56) 651 SUW LCS (24.75,103.66) NLOS 
MBS 5 (18.10,108.88) 659 SUW LCS (22.98,105.66) NLOS 




ASW LCS (44.72,79.73) 763 Submarine (44.69, 79.69) Torpedo 
 The simulation results reveal the expected outcome for missile boats and mines based on 
intuition, and an unanticipated outcome for the ASW LCS due to emergent properties. The SUW MH-
60R helicopter detects missile boats early in the scenario due to its high velocity and detection radius. The 
SUW MH-60R maintains a standoff distance of 20 nautical miles (nm) from the detected missile boats 
and passes on the position information to the SUW LCS. Guided by the antagonist’s position information, 
the SUW LCS was able to terminate each of the missile boats using its Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System 
from distances ranging from 6–20 nm without suffering any fire in return. The missile boats could not get 
close enough to the LCS to use their weapons, which had a very short range of 1 nm. The MIW LCS 
detects the mines and passes on the position information to the MIW MH-60 and the other LCSs, so that 
they can avoid colliding with the mines. The MIW LCS maintains a standoff distance of 3 nm from the 
detected mines, while the MIW MH-60, guided by the antagonist’s position information, terminates each 
of the mines using its clearance missiles.  
 The termination of the ASW LCS at the hands of the submarine was an emergent and non-
intuitive result. The ASW LCS does not have the means to terminate submarines and is restricted to 
maintain a standoff distance of 10 nm from a detected submarine and to pass on the submarine’s location 
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to the accompanying MH-60R. Once the detected submarine is within the weapon range of the ASW MH-
60R, it fires torpedo missiles on the submarine; however, because of the limited number of torpedo 
missiles onboard the ASW MH-60R, and the probability of termination associated with the torpedo 
missiles, the ASW MH-60R either missed its target or could only injure the submarine, before it ran out 
of ammunition. The submarine was then able to terminate the ASW LCS before the ASW MH-60R could 
reload its torpedo missiles. Once the ASW LCS was terminated, the ASW MH-60R could no longer 
reload and the submarine was able to escape. 
 The Naval Warfare LCS example illustrates the salient features and versatility of modeling 
complex SoS architectures using an agent-based approach. The ABM approach facilitates analysis of 
complex dynamics of interacting agents while providing the overarching capabilities that emerge from the 
interaction of complex agents. The DAF implementation used in this research allows for easy 
instantiation of scenarios, be they operational (such as in this LCS example), or even developmental. The 
simulation of developmental scenarios would be representative of the CEM and Markov frameworks that 
have focused on programmatic disruptions. The agent model simulated in our LCS scenario, while 
operational in nature, can easily be extended to include such simulation as well. 
SoS Acquisitions: Robust Investment Portfolio Approach 
Portfolio management techniques have been successfully used to address strategic-level asset 
acquisition and are extendable to include multi-period considerations.  Real options analysis, for example, 
has shown effectiveness across various industries to evaluate discrete, long-term investment strategies. 
The work by Komoroski, Housel, Hom & Mun (2006) has developed a methodology that addressees 
strategic financial decisions through an eight-phase process using a toolbox of financial techniques—
including portfolio optimization techniques. Such frameworks are geared towards financial uncertainty 
considerations of strategic projects and do not explicitly address technical architecture and/or evolving 
SoS-wide capabilities.  
Figure 2 is a simplified adaptation of the “Wave model” structure that has been advocated as a 
conceptual model for guiding SoSE in the literature (Dahmann, Rebovich, Lowry, Lane, & Baldwin, 
2011). The purpose of the Wave model is to identify SoS artifacts and their employment in the 
engineering of SoS architectures (and, ultimately, in acquisition of component systems).  Our research 
employs a lexicon, denoted by Greek letters, that indicates hierarchical levels in a system architecture, 
with the alpha (α-level) being the lowest level of operation, and moving up towards higher levels of the 
hierarchy from there—the lexicon is adapted from literature on a SoS taxonomy guide (DeLaurentis, 
Crossley, & Mane, 2011). 
The Wave model is adapted here to include hierarchy and time scale that ranges from the broad, 
overarching objectives that are strategic in nature (γ-level) to the tactical aspects of individual system 
acquisition (α-level). Research in this report addresses the β-level SoS portfolio development stage that 
evaluates candidate systems and, consequently, selects a portfolio of interdependent systems to fulfill 
overarching SoS capability objectives. The idea is to still maintain compliance with the “top-down 
integration, bottoms-up implementation” paradigm that is part of the Wave model implementation. 
Finding optimal portfolios assists in SoS architecting (e.g., ensuring capabilities are met), while also 
improving acquisition decisions for key component systems.   







The framework proposed in this report does not attempt to replace, but rather to complement, 
existing methodologies by more directly addressing issues of integration and acquisition from a robust 
portfolio theory standpoint. Robust portfolio management methodologies have been widely used by 
financial engineering practitioners to manage portfolios in the face of market volatility and uncertainties. 
In the present context, such quantitative guidance is important for providing acquisition groups with the 
means of performing acquisition, integration, and development decision-making in the mist of evolving 
capability requirements. 
Our approach seeks to leverage tools from robust portfolio methods to improve acquisition, 
integration, and development decisions while retaining advantages in balancing systems acquisition 
against evolving capability requirements. The research complements the notion of open architectures and 
modularity by providing a means of managing the possible combinations of connectible assets, and 
indirectly promoting competitive development of these interchangeable assets. 
Open Architectures, Competition, and Modularity 
Open architecture (OA) involves the design and implementation of systems that conform to a 
common and unified set of technical interfaces and business standards. This form of architecture results in 
the development of modular systems and increases opportunities for innovation and rapid development of 
new technologies that can be readily integrated/swapped into current architectures. The Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) program, for example, has recognized the need for multi-vendor acquisitions and OA 
implementations to ensure greater technological adaptability. The LCS program exploits the benefits of 
dual award contracting under fixed-price initiatives (FPI), along with rapid technology insertion processes 
and open architectures, to fulfil evolving technological and mission requirements of littoral warfare. The 
combination of dual contracting and system modularity helps achieve the necessary cost reductions while 
maintaining a greater degree of adaptability towards changing mission requirements (“LCS,” 2011; U.S. 
GAO, 2007b; Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2008). Although the platform is not, strictly speaking, a SoS, it 
nevertheless is a representative microcosm of what constitutes a SoS. The LCS platform carries many 
comparable salient features such as the confluence of multiple (sub) systems that work cohesively to 
achieve required capabilities. 
 
Figure 2. The Context of the “Wave Model” (Dahmann, 2011) in Acquisition 
Decision-Making  
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Figure 3. Littoral Combat Ship Layout 
(“LCS,” 2011) 
The benefits of open architectures and competitive contracting are intuitively clear and have been 
shown to generate notable cost savings as exhibited in previous development projects such as Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions (JDAM; U.S. GAO, 2007b). However, system integrators and program managers are 
often faced with the challenge of leveraging the potential benefits of introducing new and improved 
systems against potential risks associated with developmental disruptions and cost considerations. 
Although the LCS program had significant success through the dual contracting scheme, it still 
experienced cost overruns due to a variety of problems. The problems included risks from a simultaneous 
design and build strategy due to schedule constraints, unrealistic budget expectations, and market risk 
from the greatly increased price of steel during the development period (O’Rourke, 2011). There have 
also been revisions in the requirements of fleet capabilities and refocusing of intended capabilities 
(O’Rourke, 2011). The robust investment portfolio approach, we believe, as formulated in this research 
work, provides a beneficial framework that takes full advantage of the “open architecture” approach to 
system and capability development. It offers the combinatorial nature of “mixing and matching” feasible 
collections of systems while balancing risk (developmental), rewards (potential capabilities), and cost of 
the overall SoS. 
Concept Acquisition Portfolio: Littoral Combat Ship Example 
Littoral Combat Ships are designed and developed by two primary contractors—General Dynamics 
and Lockheed Martin—as a result of the Navy’s dual contract award strategy that seeks to minimize costs 
through competitive contracting.  The ships are designed to serve as primary units in close coastal littoral 
warfare and take advantage of modularized onboard packages (systems) that are interchangeable for 
different operational requirements. These packages include the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine 
Countermeasure (MCM) and Surface Warfare (SUW) packages. More recent developments have seen the 
introduction of an irregular warfare package for assistance and general support missions. We use this LCS 
example to demonstrate our work since it is a case where the objective is to achieve desired combat 
effectiveness and operational capabilities while minimizing cost and development risk. The simple model 
inputs and characteristics are described in Table 1. 
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Table 2. Individual System Information for LCS Example 
 
 
 Table 2 is a hypothetical and simplified catalogue of individual systems available to the Navy in its 
pursuit of achieving desired capabilities. Although the numbers are hypothetical and do not explicitly 
illustrate real data, the salient features of considering capabilities, requirements, and risk in acquisition 
problems are still preserved. Table 2 lists systems that are available for each of the three mission 
packages—ASW, MCM, SUW—along with an individual rating of system capabilities and requirements 
for the systems to operate. Additionally, Table 2 provides the system development time and associated 
acquisition costs. Systems that are unable to provide a particular capability (or do not have a particular 
requirement) have a zero entry.  Although the sea frame is typically a single system, the current sample 
problem couples the sea frame with battle management software as a base system that provides intra 
system capabilities. The development of these systems is based on a projected time schedule that is 
inherently subject to overruns and risk. This element is captured in the covariance matrix shown in Table 
3. 
  
System Capabilities System Req. Dev. Acq.
Time Cost
Weapon Threat Anti Mine Comm. Air/Sea State Air/Sea Comm. (Years) ($)
Strike Detection  Detection Capacity Capacity State
Range Range Speed
Package
ASW Variable Depth 0 50 0 0 0 0 250 125 3 3000000
Multi Fcn Tow 0 40 0 0 0 0 150 75 2 2000000
Lightweight tow 0 30 0 0 0 0 100 50 4 4000000
MCN RAMCS II 0 0 40 0 0 3 200 100 1 1000000
ALMDS (MH‐60) 0 0 30 0 0 4 100 50 2 2000000
SUW N‐LOS Missiles 25 0 0 0 0 0 200 100 3 3000000
Griffin Missiles 3 0 0 0 0 0 100 50 4 4000000
Seaframe Package System 1  0 0 0 400 4 0 0 0 3 3000000
& Combat Package System 2 0 0 0 300 4 0 0 0 4 4000000
Manage, Package System 3 0 0 0 250 3 0 0 0 5 5000000
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Variable Depth 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Multi Fcn Tow 0 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 
Lightweight tow 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0.2 
RAMCS II 0 0 0 0.3 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 0 
ALMDS (MH-60) 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
N-LOS Missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.2 0 0.1 0 
Griffin Missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.3 0 0 0 
Package System 1  0 0.1 0.3 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 
Package System 2 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.1 0 0 0.3 0 
Package System 3 0 0 0.2 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0.2 
                      
Table 3 shows the risk and interdependency aspects of the decision process. The diagonal terms 
represent the variance (degree of deviation from expected time) in development time. The off-diagonal 
terms are the variances due to interdependencies between individual systems that have commonly 
developed subsystems. For example, since the N-LOS and Griffin missile systems are both developed by 
Northrop Grumman, it is conceivable that they have common parts or undergo similar processes in 
development and manufacturing. The covariance value of 0.2 in the non-diagonal, therefore, represents 
joint development risk in terms of development time variance (e.g., 0.2 years), due to interdependencies 
between the two systems.  
Estimation of the covariance matrix entries can come directly from manufacturing and 
development data. In the case of new systems, the quantities can be estimated heuristically using basic 
rules similar to those used in project management techniques such as PERT and other CPM methods 
(Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2005). The CEM and Markov analytical frameworks from prior research efforts 
present a means of generating surrogates of these covariance matrices, through identification of 
interdependencies (covariance) between systems.  
The entries of the matrix in Table 2 are typically inferred from data; in this case, the values are 
hypothetically developed for the concept example problem.  Most of the individual systems do not bear 
many interdependencies, with the exception of the sea frame and combat management support systems 
that are interlinked more explicitly to other listed systems in Table 2.  
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Investment Model Formulation and Solution  
The problem statement for the given acquisition problem is formulated as a mathematical 
optimization problem, which requires the definition of the objective function and constraints. The 
objective function is the equation that describes the primary metric to be optimized. This typically 
translates to, for example, the maximization of profits or minimization of costs/risk in the commercial 
sense. The second important aspect deals with the formulation of constraints, which are equations that 
typically describe resource (e.g., time, cost) constraints on the system and can be manipulated to reflect 
the salient conditions of the problem to be solved.  The investment portfolio problem presented in the 
formulation shown in Equations 1–9 (also known as the Markowitz formulation) seeks to maximize the 
aggregate capabilities of a SoS architecture while minimizing the cumulative effect of cost, 
developmental time, and integration risks. The mathematical model for the concept problem can be 
written as the following: 
   max Tqc c B F F Bq q ij q q q
q qc
S R




         








X         (2) 
 
Budget (Budget Constraint)Bq q
q
C X         (3) 
 
 (Satisfy All System Requirements)B BqC q qR q
q q
S X S X             (4) 
1 1 1 1  (ASW System Compatibility)
B B BX X X        (5)  
4 5 1  (M CM  System Compatibility)
B BX X        (6) 
6 7 1  (SUW  System Compatibility)
B BX X        (7)  
8 9 10 1  (Package System Compatibility)
B B BX X X        (8)  
{0,1}(binary)BqX                      (9) 
where: qcS  : system (q)’s value for capability (c) 
 qrS  : system (q)’s value for requirement (r) 
 cR  : reference value for baseline desired SoS capability (c) 
 w  : weighting factor vector that weights importance across desired SoS capabilities 
 BqX  : decision variable of selecting system (q) 
 FqX  : decision variable of budget fraction that selecting system (q) represents 
 qC  : monetary cost of acquiring system (q) 
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 ij  : covariance matrix of risk (variances of development and integration time for   
     systems) 
   : risk aversion factor  
   : budget remainder 
 Budget : total acquisition budget    
The mathematical model shown by Equations 1–9 represents the formulation of a traditional single-
stage optimization problem that is typical of operations research and financial engineering circles. The 
current form for the portfolio model at hand is known as a quadratic integer program (QIP) and is based 
on the Markowitz formulation that seeks to generate optimal portfolios that balance potential expected 
rewards against risk. Equation 1 is the objective function. The objective is to maximize overall capability 
while minimizing cost and development risk. Equation 2 is the fraction of the budget invested in 
individual systems. Equation 3 is the budgeting constraints, where the sum of all investments in 
individual systems (and savings) must be equal to the total budget allotted. Equation 4 ensures that all 
requirements of individual systems must be met.  Equations 5–7 are the individual system compatibilities. 
In Equations 5–7, this translates to the selection of one system from each mission package (ASW, MCM, 
SUW) and a sea frame and combat management package that services the mission modules.  These 
packages are mutually exclusive and, therefore, warrant a total selection of summation equal to 1, which 
ensures that no two packages per category are selected to satisfy the respective requirements. The 
covariance matrix, as denoted by ij , represents variations in development time due to system 
interdependencies.  
The mathematical programming formulation of Equations 1–9 requires the covariance matrix to be 
positive definite (positive eigenvalues); in the context of financial applications, this means that there 
should not be a combination of assets that result in a zero net risk condition. Given that the entries of the 
covariance matrix are estimated individually, there is a possibility that the resulting matrix can violate the 
positive definite constraint; however, this can be corrected using a procedure that attempts to “find” the 
closest positive definite covariance matrix that can represent the existing covariance matrix. The 
procedure requires solution of the following optimization problem: 
  ˆmin ,Fd             (10)  
 ij ij ijl u             (11) 
 nsC           (12) 
Equation 10 is the objective function that seeks to minimize the difference between the provided 
covariance matrix, ̂ , and the closest positive definite matrix,   (decision variable). Equation 11 
enforces the condition that the entries of the matrix are bounded between some pre-determined upper and 
lower bounds. Equation 12 ensures that the covariance matrix exists in the cone of positive semi-definite 
matrices, nsC . The formulation presented in Equations 10–12 can be further altered through introduction 
of relevant constraints, to further tailor the characteristics of the covariance matrix. For example, 
constraints that enforce non-connections between systems that are known to not have any direct 
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connectivity can be enforced to ensure that the closest positive definite covariance matrix also adheres to 
such a condition. 
Investment Portfolio Robustification  
It is well known in financial engineering circles that the Markowitz formulation, as used in the 
simplified LCS scenario, is sensitive to changes in estimated quantities of the covariance matrix (system 
interdependencies) and expected return (system performance). The sensitivity due to poor covariance 
estimations can result in highly inefficient portfolios due to errors in estimation or market shifts. Such 
sensitivity issues have prompted the development of a variety of robust methods in portfolio analysis to 
ensure that the chosen portfolio of assets is stable against potential changes in market conditions/expected 
volatility. 
The current portfolio formulation in Equations 1–9 can be reformulated using robust optimization 
techniques; this includes Semi-Definite Programming (SDP) approaches (Fabozzi, Kolm, Pachamanova, 
& Focardi, 2007; Tutuncu & Cornuejols, 2007) that are extensions of modern portfolio and control 
theory. The reformulation allows for possible changes in estimated quantities (e.g., due to market shifts in 
pricing, volatility, system interdependencies) to be accounted more explicitly as uncertainty sets.  The 
resulting portfolio allocation will not change appreciably even if salient estimated quantities or benefits 
change (within prescribed limits). In the context of an acquisition problem, the use of a robust formulation 
translates to reduced costs associated with capability estimation errors, development time volatility, and 
changing requirement conditions.   
The general form of the portfolio problem in this research can be reposed as a robust optimization 
problem, given by the following form (Fabozzi et al., 2007; Tutuncu & Cornuejols, 2007): 
    max min max TiUx Ux x x              (13) 
AX B            (14) 
CX=D            (15) 
0, 0              (16) 
   ˆ ˆ| | , 1,...,i i iU i N                (17) 
ij ij
L U               (18) 
 Although the complexity of the optimization problem increases, it is nevertheless very amenable 
to a collection of numerical methods that provide good computational performance for realistic portfolio 
problems, especially portfolios with high volatility (Fabozzi et al., 2007). Equation 13 denotes the robust 
form of the objective function in (Equation 1). Equations 14 and 15 are the generalized linear form that 
represents the linear relationships in Equations 6–11. Equations 17 and 18 are the uncertainty bounds of 
the performance (capability) and operational risk due to interdependencies in each system.  The portfolio 
formulation of the LCS sample problem as shown in Equations 1–9 is rewritten to now incorporate the 
uncertainties that are associated with estimation of the covariance matrix and the effective capabilities of 
individual systems. The demonstration LCS problem assumes an uncertain covariance matrix and utilizes 
the conversion methodology as detailed in literature (Fabozzi et al., 2007) to convert the problem into an 
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SDP. Equations 1–9 are adapted into the robust framework in Equations 13–18 to yield the following 
SDP: 
   max qc c B Bq q q
q qc
S R




         









X         (20) 
Budget (Budget Constraint)Bq q
q
C X         (21) 
 (Satisfy All System Requirements)B BqC q qR q
q q
S X S X             (22) 
1 1 1 1  (ASW System Compatibility)
B B BX X X        (23)  
4 5 1  (M CM  System Compatibility)
B BX X        (24)
6 7 1  (SUW  System Compatibility)
B BX X        (25) 
8 9 10 1  (Package System Compatibility)













±  (Linear Matrix Inequality)      (27) 
{0,1}(binary)BqX           (28) 
F n
qX                      (29) 
where 
  
       , , ,     : dual variables associated with covariance term  
    : denotes trace of the product of  and   
Equations 19–28 retain most off the original form from Equations 1–9. The exceptions are that the 
uncertainty in the covariance matrix and absolute value bounds on the capability weighting vector, w, are 
reintroduced via exploitation of the dual form of the problem, now an SDP.  The reparametization of the 
problem as an SDP manifests as additional terms in the objective function and constraints, namely, 
Equations 27 and 28. Equation 27 is a linear matrix inequality and enforces the condition of positive 
definiteness due to the symmetry of the matrix and positive values of all variables in the problem.  
The uncertainty set of the covariance, as defined in Equation 15, is assumed to be +/- 10% of 
each respective entry in the matrix. This is arbitrarily chosen for this LCS demonstration problem; 
however, real-world problems will require the estimation of these bounds from statistical measures such 
as through the use of, say, confidence intervals.  Additional measures such as factor models can be used 
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to estimate the values of the covariance with respect to relevant drivers; for a SoS problem, metrics such 
as the TRL and SRL, which directly relate to project risk, may be used. 
Littoral Combat Portfolio: Results 
          The primary results are shown by varying the risk aversion parameter, , each time to generate the 
robust performance efficiency frontier. Increasing this parameter increases the portfolio’s aversion to risk. 
The increase in   forces the portfolio to select systems that have lower risk and, consequently, results in 
a lower performance of the SoS (Figure 4).      
                      
 
 
Figure 4. Robust Portfolio Efficiency Frontier 
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Figure 5. System Capabilities 
In Figure 4, each point on the frontier is a portfolio that corresponds to a chosen level of risk 
aversion and shows the amount of variance associated with it. The higher the risk aversion, the lower the 
expected SoS performance due to the trade-off in choosing say, older, more reliable technology over 
newer technologies with lower TRL values. The table within Figure 4 shows the portfolio allocation for 
each of the three critical points on the frontier, with the corresponding breakdown in capabilities for each 
portfolio of systems shown in Figure 5. Typical efficiency frontiers will have more points due to the 
combinatorial possibilities of systems available to the portfolio selection process. One system is common 
across all three portfolios, which indicates that this system has high performance and relatively low risk. 
Some systems, however, exhibit increased SoS-wide performance but with added intersystem risk. The 
trade-off between individual SoS capabilities (ASW, MCM, SUW) and risk is shown in Figure 4. The 
analysis as shown in Figures 4 and 5 is useful for acquisition practitioners to determine the appropriate 
balance of SoS-wide performance against developmental risk.  
Multiple Measures of Risk 
 The portfolio analysis method in this work can be extended to include multiple measures of risk, 
where multiple covariance matrices are used to represent the connectivity between systems, based on 
different layers of risk in developing capabilities. For example, in the case of considering risks in the 
weapons and communications layers separately, the formulation can be adapted to include the following 
constraints: 
 F Fi weaspons i weaponsX X          (30) 
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 F Fi communications i communicationsX X         (31) 
 Equations 30 and 31 represent the risk as denoted in Equation 1, but now for two separate forms 
of risk. Each equation is subject to a limit of variance, weapons / communications that is determined by the 
acquisition practitioner. Figure 6 shows (using arbitrary covariance matrices to represent risks for each 
layer) the topology of performance against each measure of risk (weapons/communications) for the LCS 
case. An increase in risk for each dimension of capability presents a potential increase in the SoS-wide 
capability. The discrete jumps in performance are reflective of the discrete nature of including individual 
systems in the portfolio of systems that constitutes the SoS architecture.  
 
 
Figure 6. Example Portfolio Assessment With Two Risks 
Future Work  
Formulating a Dynamic Investment Policy 
The multi-period portfolio problem draws upon a rich history of algorithmic development, as noted in 
literature both in the operations research and financial engineering circles. Sequential decision-making is 
known more broadly as dynamic programming, and adapts control theory methodologies to dynamic 
management of resources in the interest of maximizing (or minimizing) some given metric. The 
construction of an appropriate dynamic policy, in the context of an acquisition management problem, 
translates to balancing decisions on acquisitions and their implications of risk and potential capability 
over a specified time horizon.   












Figure 7 illustrates the generalized extension of the objective function in the robust portfolio 
formulation shown in Equation 19 to include the potential effect of current decisions on expectations 
of future portfolio performance. Decisions can include the myriad contracting and pricing initiatives 
used to control costs, improve warfighter portfolio performance, and mitigate unnecessary risk 
throughout the acquisition management phase. A good policy will also exploit potential adaptive 
traits in collections of military assets where the associated costs of evolving requirements are 
minimized due to the adaptability of the chosen set of assets.  The complexity arises in the interlinked 
nature of sequential decisions where the consequences of earlier decisions can affect the efficiency, 
cost effectiveness, and ability of military systems to adapt to new requirements.  
Figure 7. Dynamic Portfolio Extension 
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